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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Background
Bangladesh is a new nation in the world assembly of nations. On
March 26, 1971 the people of erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh,
declared themselves independent of Pakistan, of which Bangladesh had been
a part since August 14, 1947. It took another nine months and a bloody
liberation war to finally establish the Bangladesh government in Dhaka.
Since independence it faced the immediate task of consolidating the
gains of freedom for a quick transformation of the country into 'Sonar
Bangla', a popular reference to the 'Golden Bengal' of past glory.
The task was not simple. Bangladesh went through different
phases of development and experimentation on development processes in
the last decade. But the long cherished development goal of achieving
self reliancy was not reached. Geographic freedom remains to be trans-
formed into economic freedom.
Bangladesh is a rural country. Based on the preliminary census
of 1981, 89.2 percent and 10.8 percent of its population are rural and
urban respectively. Cultivation is the main occupation of the people
living in rural areas. Rural communities lack employment opportunities,
education, health and commercial facilities. The people who are most
needed in the villages for rural development are not finding villages
B.L.C. Johnson, Bangladesh (London: Heineman Educational Books,
1982), P-10.
2an attractive place to live. They are migrating to cities sometimes
sixty to seventy miles or more away from the villages. Better employment
prospects or at least the hope of these are luring them to the cities.
This further aggravates the already poor housing and employment situation
in cities. The development of Bangladesh lies in the development of its
villages. To reach that end, the tide of villagers crowding the cities
needs to be checked effectively. The reasons for poverty, inequitable
distribution of income and minimal access to the means of production by
the rural poor need to be ascertained and solutions discovered.
The Problems: National and Rural
Basic problems faced by the rural population of Bangladesh
are:
Food Shortage
Food shortage is perennial. In 1979-80, Bangladesh imported a
record 2.8 million tons of food grain. Table 1.1 gives a picture of
2
grain production and import from the year 1975 to 1981. The immediate
problem in Bangladesh is to feed the population with at least enough to
keep them alive. In 1978-1980 Bangladesh imported food grain worth $788
million which was approximately 47 percent of the country's export earning."
Land Poverty
The rural people in Bangladesh lack resources. For many, land,
the only tangible resource with which they have any contact, does not be-
long to them. Landless labourers are on the increase. Table 1.2 gives the
2
B.L.C Johnson, P-10.
3
Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, 2nd Five Year
Plan (draft) 1980-1985
, 1980, P-I-16.
percentage of landless agricultural labourers in Bangladesh.
Year
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-1981
TABLE 1.1
FOOD PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
(IN MILLION TONNES)
Net Production
11.7
10.8
12.2
11.9
12.2
13.8
Imports
1.4
0.8
1.7
1.2
2.8
1.1
(Estimated)
TABLE 1.2
LANDLESS AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS
IN BANGLADESH
Year
Percentage of total
agricultural labour
1960
1968
1974
1977
17.52
20
24.9
33
In 1960, 17.5 percent of the total agricultural labourers were landless.
In 1977 it rose to 33 percent. Moreover 50 percent of the households
Anowarulla Chowdhury, Agrarian Social Relations and Rural De-
velopment in Bangladesh (New Jersey: Allanhold, Osmun & Co., 1932), P-16.
may be considered as virtually landless since they possess less than half
an acre of land per household. A drastic and effective land reform
measure is necessary if the government really wishes to improve the con-
dition of these rural destitutes.
Inequity in Income Distribution
The population below the extreme poverty line, which is defined
by the minimum caloric requirement of 1805 calories, is 53.6 percent
and that below the poverty line of 2122 calories is 80 percent. During
the period 1969 to 1989, the gross domestic product increased by 29.6
percent whereas the real wages of the working class people remained one-
fourth to one-fifth below the 1969-1970 level. 6 This indicates that in
spite of all the "tall talking", the position of the working class people
declined while the rest of the society improved their position. As a
result, the purchasing power of the rural poor is continuously decreasing,
ultimately pushing them below the extreme poverty line. Inequality in
the distribution of income continues to remain a major problem.
Natural Calamities
Natural calamities are a constant companion to the people of
Bangladesh. A considerable amount of personal property, shelter and
crops are lost each year because of natural disasters. Coastal areas
of Bangladesh are vulnerable to cyclone and tidal waves. The whole
country is flood prone. Devastating floods, almost e^jery year, kill
cattle, damage crops and properties. In 1974, Bangladesh faced a severe
flood which officials have called the worst in twenty years. The pre-
5
Government of Bangladesh, 2nd Five Year Plan
, P-VI-5.
6
Ibid, P-I-15.
5liminary estimate of damage was equivalent to US $3.5 billion.
In addition to these root problems, some secondary problems also
need simultaneous attention. These problems are not the cause of under-
development or inequality, rather they are the effects of underdevelop-
ment and inequity. Some of these problems are:
Unemployment
Approximately 33 percent of the agricultural labour forces in
o
Bangladesh suffer from unemployment or underemployment. Most agricul-
tural labourers work only eight to nine months in a year. During the
rainy season and in slack periods, they do not normally have work. Rural
areas do not have an alternative employment generator, like industry.
Dependence on agriculture and abundancy of labour during slack periods
further reduces the daily wage rate, thus making the situation worse.
In 1978-1979, Bangladesh had 10.8 million unemployed or underemployed
people out of a total labour force of 30 million. The rate of unemploy-
ment among the total labour forces is increasing at a rate of 1.5 per-
cent annually as against an increase of 3.6 percent annually among the
g
agricultural labour forces. Rural people are the worst sufferers.
School Dropout
Fifty percent of the school age children eligible for primary edu-
cation enter school; but the percentage of dropout is more than 60 per-
cent of those enrolled. The government expenditure on education is
U.S. Government, Area Handbook for Bangladesh. Washington: 1975.
P-228.
o
Government of Bangladesh, 2nd Five Year Plan. P-VI-5.
9 .
United Nations, ESCAP, Prospect for the Economic Development of
Bangladesh in the 1980's, Vol. 31, No. 1 (June 1980): P-101.
Nurul Islam, Development Strategy of Bangladesh (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1978), P-73.
oinsignificant even for South Asian standards. In 1978-1979, public
expenditure on education in Bangladesh amounted to 8.5 percent of the
budget. The demand placed on the children, to help in family occu-
pations particularly in the cultivating season, is one of the reasons
for the large percentage of dropouts from the schools.
Population Growth
The fast growth of population during the last decade has frus-
trated all development efforts in Bangladesh. Under the present annual
rate of 2.7 percent net population growth, the population will be one
12hundred and sixty million by the end of the century. For economic
security, families tend to have more children on the belief that
children will contribute to the income of the family. In rural areas,
children are in fact taking part in agricultural and other production
activities to augment family income. Feeding the people in Bangladesh
will become increasingly difficult in the future, if drastic reduction
in the population growth is not achieved -- or if a dramatic increase
in food production is not possible.
Most of these problems are interdependent. In addition to these
examples, many problems can be traced back to these basic constraints.
Some of these problems are solvable. Some others, because of resource
constraints, remain for the foreseeable future.
Government of Bangladesh, 2nd Five Year Plan , P-VIII-3.
12
Ibid, P-XVII-27.
Bangladesh Administrative Structure
Figure 1.1
Administrative subdivisions in Bangladesh
Country: 1
i
Divisions: 4 Units
I
Districts: 19 Units
i
Subdivisions: 62 Units
I
Thanas: 464 Units
I
Unions: 4355 Units
i
Villages: 68,000 Units
Figure 1.1 gives the hierarchy of administrative subdivisions in
Bangladesh. The country is divided into four divisions. A division
generally has a population of about twenty million. It is headed by
a civil servant known as the divisional commissioner. He is a link
between the central government and the district administration and plays
a coordinating role in both administrative and development matters with-
in the districts comprising the division.
The divisions are divided into districts. Bangladesh has a total
13
of nineteen districts. A typical district has a population of around
four million. The deputy commissioner is the highest district official.
Administrative power in the district is concentrated in his hand. He
controls the district through his subordinates and is responsible for
collecting revenues, maintaining law and order and for directing develop-
ment matters within the district.
The districts in turn are subdivided into subdivisions and sub-
divisions into thanas. Bangladesh has a total of 62 subdivisions and
14
464 thanas. A subdivision may have a population of around 1.3 to 1.5
million. Subdivisional officers (SDO) are the administrators of the
subdivisions. They are intermediary between a thana and a subdivision
or district. An average of seven to eight thanas constitute a subdivision.
A thana is the basic administrative unit in Bangladesh. It is
the lowest level to which the central government has direct administrative
control. An executive known as the Circle Officer administers a thana.
Leaving aside a few thanas which are part of big cities or towns, the
remaining thanas are nothing more than police outposts. It is a node
among a cluster of villages. A thana has an average population of
150,000 to 200,000 and an approximate area of 100 square miles. The
thanas are sometimes seventy to eighty miles away from the district head-
quarters- Each thana is divided into unions and unions into villages.
An average of nine to ten unions constitute a thana. A cluster
of 15 to 16 villages makes a union. Bangladesh has a total of 4,355
13
^Stefan de Vylder, Agriculture in Chains. Bangladesh: A Case
Study in Contradictions and Constraints (London: Zed Press, 1982), P-X.
14
Ibid.
1 c
unions ° and approximately 68,000 villages. A village normally has a
population of about 500 to 1,000 people. Each union has a local govern-
ment run by the people's representatives elected by popular vote. A
map of Bangladesh delineating the administrative subdivisions is
shown in Figure 1.2.
The Importance of a Thana in Rural Development
The question arises as to why larger administrative units like
thanas are given preference in this study, while smaller units like
unions or villages, might equally be considered for an intensive effort
in development.
The necessity of local-level planning, resource limitation and
lack of technical capability at union or village level are the main
reasons for choosing a larger administrative unit like a thana. Present
administrative and technical capabilities at the thana level can be in-
creased to give it the capability to develop a comprehensive rural de-
velopment plan for the areas within its boundary. Strict coordination
of local level activities can be done, implementation through local
governments at union and village levels can be regularly monitored from
the thana centers. A thana center is generally within commuting dis-
tance from the surrounding villages. Infra-structures of the thana
centers are better than those of the villages. Because of its locational
advantage over the surrounding villages, especially in terms of trans-
portation and communication facilities , a thana has the potential to
15
ibid
Government of Bangladesh, Department of Films and Publications,
Facts about Bangladesh : 1980, P-48.
17
Nurul Islam, P-80.
1U
Figure 1 .2
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develop quickly into an activity and growth center catering to the need
of the surrounding villages. Thana centers may ultimately have proper
market, storage facilities, recreational facilities and light industries
providing additional jobs to the rural unemployed or underemployed
labourers. In short, thanas are the first level in the administrative
hierarchy that have the potential for economics of scale appropriate
to contemporary development.
Scope and Purpose of This Study
My aim in this study is to analyze the present socio economic
condition, particularly land tenure, and the administrative structure
in the rural areas of Bangladesh. I shall further look for the components
of the national problems particularly related to the question of rural
development. Furthermore, I shall examine the present rural development
policy and programs on the basis of the following criteria:
a) policy strategy at national level
b) national policy adapted at local level
c) comprehensive local plan for achieving the
national goal objectives
d) annual plan based on the long range
comprehensive local plan
e) local participation in implementing the
annual program
f) quality and quantity of feedback if any, from
the administrators and the citizens
Assuming that the Bangladesh economy will continue into the
future as a mixed economy, I shall try to pinpoint problems at the
local level, to ascertain priorities, to suggest ways and means to be
12
adopted or considered, while revising the present policy or formulating
a new policy towards rural development in Bangladesh. This study is
thus a policy proposal for developing the rural thanas in Bangladesh.
Methodology of Study
Neither a central allocative planning model of socialist
countries nor a disjointed command model of western capitalist countries
is in use in Bangladesh. In fact, most third world countries use a
form of hybrid planning which tries to incorporate the best of the two
opposing planning processes. This hybrid planning process varies widely
from country to country in terms of degree of lineancy towards social-
istic or capitalistic planning processes. In the present study the
planning model I am emphasizing is a hybrid model based on self reliancy
of Bangladesh aiming at phased reduction of dependency on foreign aid.
A literature survey and analysis will be the principal method
in preparing this study. Literature to be analyzed and evaluated in-
cludes among others:
a) Non-Bagladesh case studies of rural development
b) Bangladesh demographic, social and economic
information derived from census reports and
other publications of the government of
Bangladesh
c) Research done by various national and inter-
national organizations on various issues related
to rural development in Bangladesh
I have tried to utilize the most recent statistics available, but
still chances are there that some of the statistics or information used
in this study are possibly outdated by now. That, I believe, will not
undermine the overall thrust of the policy recommendations.
13
Outline of Study
The chapters in the study are sequenced in the following order:
Chapter Two discusses the present and past land reform measures
taken by the government. Its failure in accomplishing any measurable
change in land ownership pattern was discussed.
Chapter Three examines the positive and negative aspects of
existing hierarchial administration in Bangladesh for achieving develop-
ment goals in the rural areas.
Chapter Four deals with past and present rural development
policies and programs of Bangladesh. The causes of failure, limited
success or limitation of those programs will be discussed.
Chapter Five deals with the hurdles involved in the implementa-
tion of any program in Bangladesh. Class antagonism, conflicting social
values of the urban middle class with that of the rural poor, class
alliance of political and bureaucratic elites are some of the important
variables that contribute to the zero or negative growth derived out
of some apparently good programs. This chapter will highlight the de-
gree and nature of these apparently intangible problems.
Based on the findings of the previous chapters, Chapter Six
discusses a plausible future development strategy for rural thanas in
Bangladesh.
Chapter Seven incorporates policy proposals, based on the findings
of this study, towards the formulation of an effective rural development
policy.
Conclusions and recommendations for future study are summarized
in Chapter Eight.
CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF LAND TENURE
Historical Background
During the Mugal occupation of Bengal, "the cultivating peasantry
enjoyed security of tenure (as distinct from the idea of absolute owner-
ship) on the lands tilled by them on condition that they share their
produce with 'zamindars' (overlords acting as intermediaries between
established authority and the tillers of the soil)". 1 Zamindars were
the revenue collectors appointed by the Mugal authority to collect land
revenue from the cultivators.
When the British occupied Bengal, they made the zamindars
absolute owners of the land and the actual cultivators became tenants
to the zamindars. This was institutionalized by the enaction of the
permanent settlement act of 1793. The revenues paid by the zamindars
to the state were permanently fixed but the rents paid by the tenants
to the zamindars were not. Zamindars had the liberty of realizing any
amount of rent from the tenants and often tenants were evicted from their
houses or land — if they defaulted in payment of rent. The British
created this privileged landlord class for the dual purpose of having
a class of people friendly to the administration and ensuring regular
F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach, The Agrarian Structure
of Bangladesh: An Impediment to Development (Boulder: Westview Press,
1980), P-l.
14
15
income from land revenue at minimum adminstrative cost. Neither the
Mugal nor the British tried to improve the productivity of the land.
Their primary aim was collection of revenue. The zamindars and the
intermediate landlords between the zamindars and the tenants main-
tained their parasitic growth basing on their revenue income. They
were not cultivators themselves nor did they invest any money in the
improvement of the land.
During the Mugal rule Zamindari was a political institution
and in Bengal it traditionally belonged to the Hindus. After the
permanent settlement act of 1793 Zamindari no longer remained a
political privilege of an exclusive hereditary occupation. It became
more of an economic privilege for the landowners. Anyone with money
could buy Zamindari in the open market. 2 A new landed class of
people who were formerly revenue collectors, village leaders or agents
of the East Endia Company began to emerge. 3 At this stage another
landed class from within the Muslim community of the region also
began to develop.
The breaking up of the old landed class and the positioning
of a new landed class in its place did not bring any structural change
in agriculture. Neither the Muslim nor the Hindu landed class took
part in the organization of production. In some cases, it so happened
that there were as many as 50 intermediate landlords between the
2
B. Chowdhury, "The Dinajpur Report of Buchanon Hamilton"
Indian Studies 2: 19-36 quoted in Mohammed Shahidulla, "The political
Economy of Underdevelopment in Bangladesh Agriculture" in The Study
of Bengal: New Contributions to the Humanities and Social Sciences, ed,
Peter J. Bertocci (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1982), P-72.
3
Ibid.
16
zamindar and the tenant on a plot of land. The zamindars and the
intermediate landlords would appropriate illegal money from the tenants
in addition to land revenue. Often these illegal exactions far ex-
ceeded the actual amount of the rent. Though the rent payable to
the state by the zamindars was fixed, the zamindars continued to
increase the rent demands on the tenants through various guises. In
the year 1900, the zamindars collected land revenue totalling 160 million
taka, while revenue paid to the state was only 39 million taka. 5
In 1859 the Bengal Tenancy Act was promulgated. Subsequently
in 1883, 1885, 1938 and 1949, various reform measures were undertaken
to protect the rights and privileges of Bengali peasants. The land
laws of the nineteenth century recognized the rights of occupation
of various groups of tenants and the limits within which their rents
could be enhanced. Even then the quantum of exaction from the actual
cultivator was dependent not on the legal sanctions available, but
to a very large extent on the instrument of domination. The rent
receiving classes continued to impose customary and cultural pressure
as well as coercive and physical stress on their tenants. 6 All these
reform measures, because of pressure from the zamindars, failed to
produce desired results.
4
Kama! Siddiquee, Bangladeshe Bhumi Shangskarer Rajnaitik
Arthanithi (Political Economy of Land Reform in Bangladesh)', (Dhaka:
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1981), P-15.
5
Ibid, P-19.
Partha Chetterjee, "The Colonial State and Peasant Resistance
in Bengal, 1920-1967", Journal of Social Studies , 22 (October 1983): 8.
Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in
India (New Delhi: PPH, 1966), P-445 to 466 quoted in Kamal Siddiquee P-14
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Modification of Land System by the East Bengal
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
Following partition of the subcontinent in 1947, the aboli-
tion of the zamindari system became a topmost priority in the reform
list of the newly formed state of Pakistan. As a result, the East
Bengal State Tenancy Act of 1950 was promulgated. The new act repealed
the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 and also invalidated the permanent
settlement act of 1793. The act was intended to create a direct
relationship between the state and the cultivator by abolishing the
rent collecting rights of the zamindars working as an intermediary
between the state and the cultivators.
The system of zamindari was legally abolished through the
promulgation of this act. All intermediate rent receiving rights
were abolished. A ceiling of 100 bighas (33.3 acre) was established
as the upper! imit of land a family could possess and all land in
excess of that was to be redistributed by the state. The act was
successful in the sense that it brought the state into a direct dejure
relationship with the rent paying cultivators of land. The property
rights of the zamindars and other landholders were not abolished, only
their right as intermediary revenue collector removed. The zamindars
and other landholders became landholding tenants of the state. The
position of those below them in the agrarian hierarchy did not improve.
The act of 1950 did not threaten or alter in any substantial sense, the
traditional agrarian structure of the country. 9 And the reform that
took place was rather a revenue reform than land reform.
o
Jannuji et al
,
The Agrarian Structure of Bangladesh . P-9.
9
Ibid., P-10.
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In 1961 Ayub Khan, the dictator of Pakistan, did further
damage to the already unbalanced land owning structure of East Pakistan.
In order to ensure political support from the rural landlords, Ayub's
military government raised the 100 bigha (33.3 acre) ceiling of maxi-
mum permitted landholdings per family to 375 bighas (125 acres). Con-
fiscation of land in excess of maximum landholding permitted was very
slow. Owners of large holdings found enough time to sell or transfer
lands under Benami (fictitious) transfer documents. Out of 163,741 acres
confiscated by the government, only a small percentage was redistributed. 10
This redistribution had ^jery little effect on the overall landownership
pattern of erstwhite East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
Land Tenure in Independent
Bangladesh After 1971
Following independence in 1971, the Awami League government of
Bangladesh took immediate steps to modify the provisions of the East
Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950. The modifications that
were made are:
1. Landholdings of 25 bighas (approximately 9 acres) or less
were exempted from payment of land revenue
2. The ceiling on the size of landholding was lowered to
100 bighas (33.3 acres)
3. A de-jure means was provided by which landholders can
reacquire lands sold in distress following unprecedented floods and
destruction of crops in 1974.
Joseph F. Stepanek, Bangladesh-Equitable Growth? (New York'
Pergamon Press, 1977), P-95.
*Januzi et al
.
, P-13.
19
These modifications did not bring any substantial benefit to
the cultivators. In Bangladesh, 99 percent of the farmer families have
landhol dings below 25 bigha (9 acres). So, the benefit of tax exemp-
tion, if any, has not gone alone to the small farmers, it has gone to
12the big farmers too. Landless families did not get anything out of
this tax exemption. Although the land revenue for landholdings below 25
bigha was exempted, the development taxes on land were not. The farmers
had to go to the tahsildars (government revenue collector) to pay the
development tax and often became victim of exploitations by the tahsildars.
Families having more than 100 bigha (33.3 acres) were asked to
surrender the excess land to the government for subsequent redistribution
to the landless or near landless people. It was estimated that 0.4 million
acres will be available for distribution from the surplus land of the fam-
ilies having more than 100 bigha. 13 But in reality only 58,409 acres,
which is less than 15 percent of the estimated total, were declared excess
by the landlords. By January 1976, government could take possession of
only 31,250 acres out of the total declared excess by the landlords. 14
In 1973 total distributable government land was 4,15,612 acres, out of
which only 900 acres were distributed. Until 1976 only 25 percent of the
total distributable government land was settled. 15 More over because of
corruption by the revenue officers, landlords, as against landless people,
got the allotment of land. Even when the landless people got allotment,
they could not use it as big farmers and landlords took possession of those
lands by force.
12 n
Kama! Siddiquee, P-66. Ibid., P-68.
14
Ibid. 15 Ibid., P-70.
Ibid.
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Thus in contemporary Bangladesh, the relations of people to
the land have remained relatively unchanged since the nineteenth
century despite the legislation enacted since independence from
Pakistan. Based on the 1978 land occupancy survey, 10 percent of
the households in Bangladesh, own 49 percent of the land, 11.59
percent of the households have no homestead or cultivable land, while
28.78 percent of the households have homestead land but no cultivable
land. A total of 40.37 percent household do not possess any culti-
18
vable land. The situation is becoming worse day by day. In 1964-
1968, only 20 percent of the rural households were without cultivable
19
land. But in 1978, the figure rose alarmingly to 40.37 percent.
17 Jannuzi et al
.
, P-15.
18
Ibid., P-107 (calculated from Table E-l)
19
Stepanek, P-98.
CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
Historical Background
Bangladesh inherited a colonial system of administration from
the British. It went through the 23 years of existence of unified
Pakistan without any significant structural change in its administra-
tive system. During Mugal time, a 'suba' or province was the strate-
gic unit of administration. The British chose a smaller area district
with a smaller population — between one to five million. 1 The head
of the district was usually a member of the elite Indian Civil Service.
He was variously known as the collector, deputy magistrate and the
deputy commissioner. He used to wield immense power and responsibility.
In the course of time, new activities were added to his responsibility.
But right up to 1947, the collector combined in his person, the powers
of the senior magistrate with supervision over other magistrates,
powers of revenue collector, and all the residual authority of one who
more than anyone else represented the majesty of the British rule in
2
the district. He was never a part of the people. In official terms
he was a public servant, but in reality his behavior towards the people
was paternalistic.
Inayetulla, "Local Administration in a Developing Country" in
Development Administration in Asia , ed. Edward W. Weidner (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1970), P-281.
2
Ibid.
22
This very system continued after the partition of India.
Field administration was bureaucratically controlled; and deputy
commissioners ruled districts from the district headquarters. Some-
times the outlying thanas were 70 to 80 miles or more away from the
district headquarters. Thana development administration at such
distances was always loose and in most cases did not produce
desired results. Local bodies, especially in the rural areas were
hardly more than a mere appendage to the district administation. 3
One important reason for the failures encountered in development work
is the inadequacy of the administrative structure. Wiedner commented,
"Almost all the countries of southeast Asia have planning commissions
that work carefully to put out five year plans or their equivalent.
The great majority of these plans have been complete failures in
practice, no matter what their technical quality. Prominent among the
reasons for failure is an inadequate administrative system."4
Little attention was paid to the reform of administrative
strucutre during the first decade of the existance of Pakistan. The
first major attempt in this line was made by the military dictator
Ayub Khan. In 1962 he introduced a new system commonly known as Basic
Democracies (BD). In spirit and style the BD system was different from
the old system of administration. It stood for a strong executive and
at the same time provided for an independent judiciary and representative
legislative. A series of steps were taken at the provincial and local
levels to decentralize authority, to experiment with new organizational
3
Ibid., P-292.
4
Edward W. Weidner, "The Elements of Development Administration"
in Development Administration in Asia. ed. Edward W. Weidner (Durham-
Duke University Press, 1970), P-ll.
23
devices for developmental activities, to strengthen the departments by
evolving improved personal practices and most significant of all by
introducing a viable and vital system of local self-government. 5 Its
aim was:
1. to ensure coordinated administration of governmental
service and supplies for accelerating socio-economic development of
rural areas
2. to utilize viewpoints and experiences of both the elected
representatives and trained governmental functionaries by bringing them
together under the local councils at all levels of field administration
3. to make the field bureaucracy responsible and responsive
to the demands of the rural populace whose elected representatives could
freely discuss their needs and press for meeting them in the forum of the
local councils
In the BD system, people elected BD members and the BD members
in turn elected the parliament members and the president. Except-
ing this concept of indirect election, the importance of improving the
quality of life in the rural areas through rural works program and the
increased participation of basic democrats in the development works in
their local areas can hardly be questioned. 7 Thana councils and district
councils were formed with elected and appointed members from the civil
services to undertake development work. Much of the development work
5
Inayetulla, P-285.
A.M.M. Shawkat Ali, Field Administration and Rural Development in
Bangladesh (Dhaka: Center for Social Studies, Dhaka University, 1972), P-8.
Ibid., P-83, and Rounaq Jahan "East Pakistan During the Decade of
Ayub in Prelude to Crisis. Bengal & Bengal Studies in 1970, ed. Peter
Bertocci (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1972), P-8
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in rural areas was coordinated through the thana council and thana
functionary circle officer.
The thana, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, was
given importance as rural activity center. In terms of quantitative
growth, Ayub's BD system worked well. During the period from October
1958 to March 1969, Pakistan experienced an economic growth that was
spectacular for Asia in gross quantitative terms. But it occurred
within a context of increasing economic inequality between a tiny
upper class on the one hand and an enormous lower class on the other.
g
Macro growth was six percnet per year for the decade.
The rural works program fund was utilized through the basic
democrats. There were complaints of misappropriation of funds. Also
the growing economic and political powers of the BD members increased
g
the inequality in the rural areas. The middle class and urban in-
telligensia were not happy with the BD system. To them it was anti-
ethical, as it goes against liberal democratic ideals of universal
adult franchise and direct election.
After independence, elections were held at union level to elect
union council members. But no elections were held to elect members for
the thana and the district councils, despite specific constitutional
provisions in that regard, during Awami League's time. Chaos and
confusion was the norm. Development work was hampered because of undue
political pressure by the Awami League cadres.
o
Robert Laporte, Jr., "Pakistan and Bangladesh" in Politics and
Modernization in South and Southeast Asia
, ed. Robert N. Kearney (New
York: Schewkma Publishing Co., 1975), P-124.
9
Rounaq Jahan, P-ll.
10
Ibid.
Awami League was the ruling party in 1972. Shaikh Mujibur
Rahman was the prime minister.
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When Ziaur Rahman came into power, like Ayub Khan he also
gave strong importance to the executive at the district level. Deputy
commissioners remained the major coordinators of development works in the
rural areas. Like the Awami League regime, no local government was
formed at the thana and district level. Some successful experiments
12
were done with 'Shanirvar' program based on the concept of self
help. All these programs were executive led, with local people
having little to say in the planning process. They were called in at the
implementation stage. The success of most of these programs ~ most
of them were model projects -- can be mainly attributed to the dedication
and persuasion of the executive concerned and the direct support it
received from the government. Pilot projects or experiments with better
political support, better finance and better leadership almost never fail. 13
Since that may not be the case for projects in a national scale, mass
scale self reliant projects without the people's participation in the
planning process should be viewed with caution.
The first serious attempt to reorganize administration in Bangladesh
was made by the present government of General Ershad in 1982. On October
24, 1982, the president declared administrative decentralization with the
thana as the basic unit. In the first phase of implementation, 45 thanas
were upgraded. These thanas started functioning from November 7, 1982.
14
12
Bengali word meaning self reliant.
13
Sook Bang, "Integrated approach for development programs:
Dangers and Prospects" in I ntegrated Approach to Rural Development
, ed.
Marilyn Campbell (Ottwa: International Development Research Center, 1975),
14
Government of Bangladesh, "Bangladesh Embarks on a Process of
Decentralization of Administration" Dhaka 1982 (Mimeographed)
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A new administrative setup emerged in the thanas with an elected
chairman to work as head and a trained senior executive as its executive
officer. The setup aims at increasing participation in decision making
and developing activities at the thana level. In March 1984, upgraded
thanas were to have elections to elect thana chairman. Time is not
ripe to comment on the outcome of this administrative change now. But
it seems the government is on the right track in bringing the administra-
tion near the people. A comprehensive plan supported by annual target
plans for the areas constituting a thana and its implementation would
result in the achievement of the long cherished desire to accomplish
self reliancy by an all out effort in rural development in Bangladesh.
CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PAST AND
PRESENT, A CRITICAL EVALUATION
From age immemorial, Bangladesh has been an agricultural
country. During most of the time of its existence, it has served
the interest of its foreign rulers. The rulers had only one selfish
aim -- uninterrupted collection of revenue. Bangladesh basically
served as hinterland for the development of distant urban centers both
during Mugal and British rule. Though some spot developments were
done here and there, no conscious effort was really made to improve
or radically change the social and economic condition of the predominantly
rural Bangladesh.
Colonial Inheritance
By introducing the permanent settlement act of 1793, the British
created a new class of landlords known as zamindars. They were created
to secure loyalty and stabilize revenue receipts. Zamindars were con-
sidered the owners of the land and actual tillers were classified as
tenants of the zamindar. The revenue paid by the zamindar to the govern-
ment were fixed, but the rents paid to the zamindars by the tenants were
not fixed. The zamindars enjoyed the freedom of extracting any amount of
rent from the tenants. The peasants became the victim of exploitation by
the zamindars and their agents.
Anwarulla Chowdhury, Agrarian Social Relations and Rural Develop -
ment in Bangladesh (New Jersey: Allanheld, Osman Publishers, 1982), P-71.
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The formal institutions of government were kept to a minimum.
Government administration below the subdivision level was virtually
non-existent. Rural Bangladesh was in fact administered through
private bureaucracy of the zamindars. Neither the zamindars nor the
British government invested any money out of their revenue income for
the improvement of the land. During the later part of the British rule,
the government was considering establishment of circle board (Present
day thana council) below the subdivision level for directing relief
activities during famine, helping schemes in connection with coopera-
tive credit movement and the development of agricultural demonstration. 2
But this program was never accomplished during British rule.
During 1930 's, some civil servants, such as Nurunnabi Chowdhury
and H.S.M. Ishaque, became interested in rural development. As admini-
strators they tried to accomplish some development work in their re-
3
spective areas. All these were isolated attempts made by individuals
or groups towards rural development. Until the partition in 1947, there
were no coordinated rural development programs for the whole of Bangladesh,
Rural Development Program During Pakistan Time
V-AID Program
The first organized rural development program was launched by the
then East Pakistan government in the year 1954. It was aided by United
2
The Bengal District Administration Inquiry Committee Report 1913
1914 (E.J. Levinge-Chairman) quoted in A.M.M. Shawkat Ali, Field Admini -
stration and Rural Development in Bangla desh, (Dhaka: Center for Social
btucnes, unaka University: 1982), P-37.
3
Anwarulla Chowdhury, P-73.
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States and was known as village agricultural and industrial develop-
ment program. It advocated four basic programs: a) experts, develop-
ment centers at thana headquarters; b) trained workers at the village
level; c) village councils or the base agency for carrying out the
actual work and; d) issue of grants-known as aided self help. 4 It
was hoped that V-AID programs would generate employment and stimulate
overall village development. But unfortunately the program was a
failure because of the following reasons:
a) the village councils which were supposed
to implement the program under the guidance
of V-AID workers did not function well because
of conflicting group interests
b) self-help projects suffered due to lack of
voluntary participation
c) priorities assigned by villagers to various
projects were always in conflict with those
of V-AID workers 5
d) the projects were excessively dependent on
foreign aid and experts.
The program was abolished in June 1961.
4
Ibid., P-75.
5
M. Alamgir, "Programs of Environmental Improvement at
the Community Level", Econom ic Bulletin for the Asia and Pacific,
32 (June 1981): 70. " — -
Anwarulla Chowdhury, P-76.
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Comi'lla Cooperative Program
The Comilla cooperative program was pioneered by Dr. A.
Hamid Khan in the year 1961 and was launched in Kotowali thana of
Comilla district. The program was the outcome of field research
done by the Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Academy of Rural Development in
Comilla. The comilla cooperative system consists of a village credit
cooperative run by villagers at the village level; and a central
cooperative at the thana level responsible for supplying new techno-
logy, agricultural inputs like fertilizer, insecticide, high yielding
variety seeds etc., training the cooperative members and supervision.
The cooperative was intended for small farmers with the strategy of
avoiding domination by big farmers, though the big farmers would not
be excluded from the cooperative.
Big farmers were sceptical about the outcome of the coopera-
tives, so they did not join initially. Small farmers were mainly the
members of these cooperatives. Number of cooperative societies grew
rapidly and by 1970 eleven more thanas in Comilla district joined the
program. The thana central cooperative provided village cooperatives
with loans, irrigation pumps, fertilizer, seeds, etc. Growth of mem-
bership in the cooperatives and repayment of loans by the cooperative
members was encouraging as is evident from the following table 4.1. 7
Robert D. Stevens, "Comilla Rural Development Program to 1971"
in Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan , ed. Robert D. Stevens
et al. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), P-101.
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Considering the per capita income of $100 in 1970, the savings
shown in the table is significant. In Comilla Kotowali Thana in
1968/69, 37 percent of the farmers were cooperative members. They
increased yield by 98 percent as compared with only 10 percent for a
control group of farmers outside Comilla Thana. 8 The pioneering work
done in Comilla in sixties was encouraging and the Comilla model was
thought to be effective for the whole of the country.
Emergence of Bangladesh
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Bangladesh
government took an ambitious scheme for phased implementation of Comilla
type model cooperatives throughout the country. The scheme was given
the name 'Integrated Rural Development Program'. It has the following
objectives as defined by A.N.M. Eusuf, Registrar of Cooperative societies,
Q
government of Bangladesh:
1. to create an institutional infrastructure for effective
utilization of resources available for development through the two tier
cooperative model
2. to organize farmers into permanent cohesive disciplined
groups for planned programs primarily aimed at agricultural development
3. to utilize institutional credit facilities offered and super-
vised by the Thana Central Cooperative Society (TCCA) and to build rural
capital through shares and savings
8
Ibid., P-104.
9
A.N.M. Eusuf "The Integrated Rural Development Program in
Bangladesh" in Integrated Approach to Local Rural Development
, ed.
Marilyn Campbell (Ottawa: International Development Research Center,
1975), P-22.
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4. to select agricultural innovations and to promote adoption
of such innovations by individual members through cooperatives
5. to study and experiment for further development and prepare
plans for development in areas such as warehousing, marketing, processing,
rural electrification, education, health, housing etc.
6. to develop local leadership through participation in training
by village leaders, managers, model farmers, chairman and accountants
organized by the TCCA.
The first level in the cooperative models is village level cooperative
society and the second level is thana level cooperative society (TCCA).
TCCA has wider responsibility. It is responsible for the preparation of
annual production plans, the procurement of necessary inputs, the dis-
tribution and realization of credit and the arrangement of supplies and
services for implementing the program. But the most important function
of TCCA is training of managers, model farmers and chairmen of the village
cooperative societies.
The pre-independence success story of Comilla thana did not remain
unblemished after the independence. Post independence record of IRDP
cooperatives was a mixture of success and failure. The IRDP is yet to
expand itself to all the Thanas of the country. Fewer than 40 percent of
the total farm families have been covered by the cooperative system dev-
eloped in Comilla. The rate of growth of membership in societies and
the number of societies has declined greatly and loans forwarded to cooper-
atives largely remained unrealized.
Quazi Md. Munjur-I-Mowla. "Comilla and U-J: A Comparative
Study in Rural Development Policies", Journal of Social Studies 10(October 1980) : 94.
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Though the original Comilla cooperatives were intended for the
protection of small and medium farmers against the large owners and
money lenders, the IRDP cooperatives were soon taken over by the large
farmers. Some of the traditional village leaders and rural elites who
were sceptic at the beginning of the Comilla type program are now be-
ginning to join the program. Some of them are not even farmers. In
the first managing committee of Comilla Kotowali Thana cooperative,
67 percent of the office bearers had farming as their main occupation.
But in 1969-70 only 17 percent of the managing committee members of the
society had farming as their main occupation. The members of the man-
aging committee are now having long overdue loans themselves. Accord-
ing to one study quoted by Stefan de Vylder, a large proportion
(52 percent) of the defaulters were the members of the managing committees
of the primary societies while 79 percent of these defaulting members
were directors and office bearers of the managing committee. 12 In the
earlier years small farmers derived benefit out of the cooperative pro-
gram. But now whatever benefit is accrued from the program is going to
make the large farmers richer. The smaller farmers are increasingly
becoming poorer.
One vital weakness of the original Comilla model and subsequent
IRDP cooperatives is its inability to include landless labourers in the
program. None of the members of the village cooperatives are landless.
So, out of all government subsidy to the cooperatives and the increase
Badruddin Ahmad, Who Decides (Comilla: Bangladesh Academy for
Rural Development, 1972), P-16 & 37.
12
Stefan de Vylder. Agriculture in Chain. Bangladesh- A Case Studv
in Contradiction and Constraints (London": Zed Press, 1982), P-147'.
~
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in yield, the landless labourers gained little. The landholding patterns
of cooperative members in a Comilla village as studied by Majumdar 13 is
given in Table 2.2.
TABLE 4.2
LANDHOLDING PATTERN OF COOPERATIVE
MEMBERS IN A COMILLA VILLAGE
Landholding
Category
No. of
Members
Percentage
Landless nil nil
Below 1 acre 4 11.5
1 to 2 acres 20 57.5
2 to 5 acres 6 17
Above 5 acres 5 14
Total 35 100
The near landless category of people (i.e. holdings less than one
acre) is also not well represented in the village cooperatives. Landless
and near landless labourers were excluded in actual practice from the coop-
eratives since they could not obtain any credit which required land
collateral
.
So, the second important weakness of IRDP cooperatives is their
inability to prevent domination by big farmers. Management of the
13,
A. Mannan Majunmdar "Village Mohajanpur" in Exploi tation and the
Rural Poor, ed. M. Ameerul Huq (Comilla: Bard, 1975) quoted in Anwarulla
Chowdhury, P-79.
14
Stefan de Vylder, P-144,
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cooperatives was in the hands of the big farmers even in the initial
stage of Comilla cooperative which will be evident from the following
Table 2.3. 15
TABLE 4.3
LANDHOLDING OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE MANAGING COMMITTEE
(COMILLA KOTOWALI THANA)
1966-1968
Landhol dings
Category
Landless
Below 1 acre
1 to 2 acres
3 to 5 acres
Above 5 acres
Total
No. of
Members
3
4
5
12
Percentage
25
33
42
100
'
Shanirvar' Movement
The Bengali word "shanirvar 1 means self reliance. The pioneer of
this movement was Mahbub Alam Chashi. From the later part of 1975, the
movement started to gain popularity in the development circle. Chashi,
the initiator of the movement, summed up the objectives and goals of
Shanirvar as:
15
Badruddin Ahnad, P-35.
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".
. .
sustained national effort to make the country self-
sufficient and ultimatley surplus in food production and also
self-reliant in all other sectors of economy .... Its central
focus is on the rural sector and the initial thrust is to create
an awareness among the rural people about the development pos-
sibilities of their individual rural areas on the basis of their,
own resources - physical and human, official and non official." 16
The main emphasis of the shanirvar ideology is on self help and
maximum utilization of unutilized or underutilized resources. The
Shanirvar movement further emphasizes voluntary participation. In the
initial stage shanirvar program was an isolated locally-organized program.
But afterward in the process, mainly because of the initiative of Chashi,
the program got national recognition and became a national movement. A
six tier organizational structure at the village, Union, Thana, subdi-
vision, district and national level was formed for the implementation of
the program. Each level committee is responsible for its area and aims
at self-sufficiency in its area.
Unlike IRDP, shanirvar programs are bureaucrat led programs. One of
the most successful examples of a shanirvar program is Ullashi-Jadunathur
project in Jessore district. Under the leadership of Deputy Commissioner,
Jessore the Ullashi-Jadunathpur canal was dug in a record time of six months
by the local people. Forty three percent of the work was done by volun-
tary labour by the villagers, members of armed forces and ansars. The
remaining 57 percent was done by hired labourers. 17
M.A. Chashi, "Self Reliant Rural Bangladesh, Problems & Prospects"
Paper read at the 2nd annual conference of the Bangladesh Economic Associ-
£,2"?,. .?; Quoted in M - Gu1am Satta r» Rural Development Through Self
Helf (Coimlla: BARD, 1979), P-33.
M Gulam Sattar, Rural Development Through Self Help (Commilla-
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, i^79) P-I8.
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The total cost of construction was Taka 1,930,000 of which Taka
984,000 was direct government grant. 18 Landless labourers worked five
days per week as paid workers and two days per week as voluntary labours.
Big farmers and businessmen did not take part physically but they con-
tributed cash money to hire labour for doing their part of the work. A
large part of the work was done by mobilization of local resources --
human as well as material. Both pressure and persuasion went side by
side in the resource mobilization process.
In IRDP type project, the landless labourers get very little or
nothing. But in Ullashi landless labourers were employed five days a week
and remaining two days they were persuaded to work free. Benefits from
these types of projects will go largely to the landowners because of
better irrigation and drainage resulting in higher crop yield. As usual,
the landless poor will get nothing.
In Ullashi local organizations and local people were not involved
20in the planning process. The plan for canal digging was imposed on
them from the top. Neither Comilla nor Ullashi is an attempt at social
21
revolution. Their aim is to increase production, increase the income
of the rural people, but without changing the social structure. A de-
liberate attempt to maintain status quo is visible in both the programs.
IRDP emphasizes on institution buildup and training. Thanas are given
18 Id
Ibid.
,
P-24. iy Ibid., P-20.
20^ u
Ibid., P-19,20.
21Quazi Md. Munjur-I-Mowla, "Comilla and U-3: A Comparative
Study in Rural Development Policies." Journal of Social Studies 10(October 1980): 106.
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importance in IRDP programs as center for coordination and training of
the village cooperative members.
Like the first five-year plan, and in the second five year
plan of 1980-1985 also, the Bangladesh government has high hopes of
achieveing growth and equity through a strategy of comprehensive rural
22development plan. But it does not explain how the plan is going to
achieve equitable distribution of income to alleviate the sufferings
of the rural poor.
22
Government of Bangladesh, 2nd Five-Year Plan (Draft) 1980-1985(Dhaka: Planning Commission, 1980), P-VII-3
CHAPTER 5
POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION
FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Who wields power in Bangladesh? Answering this question is
important before undertaking any development activity in Bangladesh.
In present day Bangladesh, industrialists or multi-national corpora-
tions are not powerful enough to influence decisions within the
government. If so, who holds power in Bangladesh?
Bangladesh is a four-way partnership between bureaucrats,
military, urban middle class, and rural elites. Power is shared be-
tween these groups in varying proportions. From 1971 to 1984 Bangladesh
had several governments but the very nature of power sharing did not
change. With the change in governments, groups only changed positions,
one group coming closer to power than the other. The poor were always
ruled. They never had the chance of controlling the affairs of their
own country in which they are a majority.
In the past thirteen years of its existance, Bangladesh has had
both civilian and military governments. When the civilian governments
were in power, the urban middle class was the dominant force in the
arena of power. From 1972 to 1975 Awami Leage, a nationalist political
party, was in power. The urban middle class was its support base.
Almost the entire middle class -- lawyers, doctors, students, teachers
and government servants; and the entrepreneurial class supported the
40
41
Awami League program of full regional autonomy. 1 Awami League leaders
and cadres enjoyed power and exerted immense influence on administrative
machinery. The bureaucrats, though considered essential for their
expertise in general administration, did not enjoy the same power as
the party stalwarts and cadres.
2
But after the killing of Mujib , when the army came into power,
the bureaucrats were given more power than the past political administra-
tion. The army had no alternative except conferring administrative
responsibilities on the bureaucrats while the overall supervision rested
on the army personnel. The army, since it could not believe the existing
political parties and because of its training in discipline, sought
alliance with another trained cadre; the civil servants. That is why in
Bangladesh, the bureaucrats are enjoying more power and prestige under
the protection of the army rule.
The rural elites like union council chairman, local member,
imam (priest) of local mosque have kinship ties with the urban elites.
These ties are continuously strengthened through social contacts and
marriages. They maintain a hot relationship with local officials such
as the circle officer, the thana agricultural officer and the police
chief to enhance their political and economic prestige. Urban based
political organizations maintain their rural links through the rural
elites.
Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its After-
math (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International Limited, 1980), P-29.
2
Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, prime minister of Bangladesh in the early
days of independence.
3
B.K. Jahangir, Differentiation, Polarization and Confrontation
in Rural Bangladesh (Dhaka: Centre for Social Studies, Dhaka University,
1979), P-253.
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A vast majority of the urban middle class believe in liberal
democracy while an increasing number of students believe socialism is
the cure to all the malices in Bangladesh. The army is faction ridden.
The Bangalees have observed coups and counter coups within the army
based on political doctrination.
Religion plays an important role in the day to day life in rural
5
Bangladesh. Even the government does not want to take drastic measures
in delicate religious issues like family planning and population control
for fear of losing popularity. The urban middle class, though generally
acknowledging a population problem, does not really practice family planning.
An enormous gap between acknowledging a population problem and an effec-
tive pursuit to limit its growth exist. The first family planning
minister of Bangladesh used to associate family planning with slaughter.
The village mollas and the imams (priests) regularly present frightening
o
images of communism during Friday prayers and Eid congregations.
In the context of Bangladesh, a true understanding of these
complex power relationships and values is a necessary pre-requisite for
any development activity.
4
A touching detail of faction politics within the army is given
in Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London:
Zed Press, 1979).
5
Clarence Maloney, Peoples of South Asia (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, Inc., 1974), P-199.
Marcus F. Franda, "Perceptions of a Population Policy for
Bangladesh", American Universities Field Staff Reports , South Asia
Series, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Bangladesh), 1973, P-6.
7
Ibid, P-2.
p
A similar incident is reported in a case study by B.K. Jahangir
in Differentiation, Polarization and Confrontation in Rural Banglades h,
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In the event of land reform, those people who will have to
surrender their rights on surplus land belong to the power group
mentioned earlier. Any drastic reform measure is bound to encounter
objections from interest groups within the inner circle of the govern-
ment. To remain in power, governments in the past always submitted to
these inner pressures. Any reasonable government plan gets diluted
in this way, before it reaches the lower echelon.
In the context of Bangladesh, B. K. Jahangir is right in
asserting that, "policy framing, development strategy and decision
making are exclusive concerns of the inner circles of power ....
Decentralization, verging on social activities, devoid of ideological
orientations gets recommendation from the government. Interest in local
and sectoral problems is considered legitimate, but legitimate par-
ticipation in an organized way in the arena of decision making, or in
9
the political struggle for the control of the state is suspect.
A vicious cycle operates in all the poorer countries. It is
not the fact that reform is impossible, rather the reality is that no
reform measure will be taken if it goes against certain vested interests.
"It is not just a lack of capital, just backward ways or just a popu-
lation problem or even just a political problem which weighs upon the
poorer nations. It's a combination of all of these, each aggravating
the other." 10
To be successful, a reform measure might be painful. Some
degree of rigidity in implementation may even be necessary. The price
9
B.K. Jahangir "The State as a Relation of Production: Bangladesh",
The Journal of Social Studies , 18 (October 1982): 116
Robert L. Heilbroner
& Row Publishers, 1963) P-72.
, The Great Ascent, (New York: Harper
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of development is likely to be political and economic authoritarianism.
It may either be left wing or military nationalistic rule. In a
majority of the Latin American countries land reform was implemented
by military governments. Reform programs in Latin America, though
initially successful, became a futile exercise in the long run. The
absence of a systematic program and political motivation to transform
the benefits of land reform into a lasting economic growth in real terms
is mainly responsible for this failure. This is why in Mexico, land-
less people who became landowners in 1940, became landless again in
the 1960's.
12
Another factor which is crucial in Bangladesh politics is
13Bangalee emotion. There are examples where Bengali pride and emotion
were used by politicians for the wrong purposes. At the same time
examples can be cited where this pride and emotion were used to unite
the whole nation. In the 1965 war against India, the people of Pakistan
including the present day Bangladesh were united against India. After
a call by President Ayub khan, the people voluntarily deposited cash and
valuables in banks to support the war against India. That was the only
year in the history of Pakistan when domestic savings rose to a peak of
13 percent of the GDP compared to 8.7 percent of the GDP in 1976-77. 14
The same thing happened in 1971; 70 million Bangalees were united in
U
Ibid, P-28.
12
World Bank, Land Reform in Latin America
, World Bank Staff
Working paper No. 275, 1978, P-17.
13
'Bangalee' stands for 'Bangalee' nation. But the word 'Bengali'
indicates the language spoken by the Bangalees.
14
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 5th Five Year
Plan, (Karachi: Planning Commission, 1978), P-3.
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response to a call by Shaikh Mujibur Rahman to liberate Bangladesh from
the clutches of Pakistan.
Can this emotion and pride be used again for a different cause;
economic development of the country? Possibly, yes. But a different
strategy is necessary to be worked out. Historically Bangladesh was
always ruled by foreigners. The British ruled Bengal from London through
their viceroys in Delhi. The Mugals did the same; they ruled from their
capital in Delhi. Bangalee revolts or protests always took time to rock
the seat of power in Delhi or London because it had to pass through the
Bengal representatives of the rulers. They possibly got used to it and
found it more acceptable to be ruled by a foreigner than a fellow
Bangalee. The Nawabs of Dhaka were quick to realize this facet of
Bangalee character. To remain superior, they maintained a difference
with the Bangalees. Bengali never became their household language;
though they enjoyed power and prestige as Bangalees in Bengal.
Now after the liberation of Bangladesh, Bangalees are ruled by
Bangalees. The person who is elected as a president is a Bangalee, the
one who is thrown out is also a Bangalee and the person who will come
to power will also be a Bangalee. Though stability is a precondition
for development, since independence the Bangalees were not fortunate
enough to have that.
In addition to economic frustration and mounting inequality,
it is also a factor that the Bangalees are facing difficulty in having
faith in their own leaders. Do all these factors equate against
stability? Empirical evidences are not available to support or deny it.
Assuming that the assertions are true, can the leaders have some patience
against criticism? Instead of pointing guns at the people can they come
down to them? Can they make some honest confessions about their program
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and what they have achieved? Can they explain the reasons why some of
their programs were a flop? Instead of finding scapegoats, can they be-
come bold enough to accept the truth and accept responsibility for
failure?
If they come out to the people and volunteer to accept punish-
ment for the mistakes, then possibly people won't have to burn public
properties, possibly they won't make rubble out of what is achieved
at the cost of meagre resources. The non-violent way of protesting by
Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King in the USA was successful in
producing immense psychological pressure on the good sense of the ruling
class. The rulers realized it yery well that a stone throwing mob can
be fought, but not a dedicated group of people who aim at hitting the
conscience of the rulers silently.
A similar technique, but from the other direction, should be
used in Bangladesh. A non-violent response by a ruling government to
a violent agitation by the people is likely to produce some psychologi-
cal pressure on the good sense of the people. Bangalee emotion and
pride for the country would work at that stage; their good sense would
distinguish the public property from the government.
The author is optimistic; the people will have a sweeping turn
in their attitude towards the government -- the government will have a
new mandate to continue their program. Compared to the administrative
practices of the past, this proposal may sound Utopian, but it may have
more positive elements for success than the traditional approaches.
CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE RURAL THANAS IN
BANGLADESH: AN EMPHASIS ON LAND REFORM &
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
Land Reform
Of the three major resources of land, labour and capital both
land and capital are in short supply in Bangladesh. The average size of
an agricult-ural farm was only 2.5 acre 1 in 1977 and it is decreasing at
a very fast rate. The only abundance Bangladesh has, is in the supply of
unskilled manpower. Any development in Bangladesh should aim at:
1. Fast increase in agricultural production, and
2. Equitable distribution of income to alleviate the condition
of the land-less poor
by the maximum utlization of the existing resources. Per household land
holding in Bangladesh is less than the world averages, but still that is
the only major area from which Bangladesh can derive its capital for
development. The 1977 land occupancy survey of Bangladesh found that
8.6 percent of the household having five acres to over fifteen acres of
land own 43 percent of the total agricultural land in Bangladesh. 2 If
Peter J. Bertocci, "Structural Fragmentation and Peasant Classes
in Bangladesh", Journal of Social Studies 5 (October 1979): P-49.
2
Summary Report of the 1977 Land Occupancy Survey of Rural
Bangladesh (adapted). Quoted in United Nations Economic Bulletin for
Asia and the Pacific, "Prospect for the Economic Development of Bangladesh
in 1980' s", Vol XXXI, No. 1, (June 1980): P-102.
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the maximum land allowed to a household is five acres, approximately 20
percent of the total agricultural land will be available for redistribu-
tion. Twenty percent of the total agricultural land of about 19.35
3
million acres, will amount to 3.87 million acres.
In addition to these lands, the central government owns (Khas)
1.4 million acres of land. Based on the 1977 land occupancy survey,
6,933,000 households having nil or less than one acre holdings own a
total of 1.8 million acres. If the surplus land of 3.87 million acres
and the government's land of 1.4 million acres are distributed equitably
among the 6,933,000 households, then each household will have 1.02 acres
of land. Srilanka experienced success in expropriating excess land from
the surplus holding farmers. A clause in the Srilanka land reform law
allowed the government to expropriate land in excess of the government
approved ceiling without compensation if declarations on land holdings
were not made within the time limit or if they were proved to be false.
The clause had tremendous effect; by the end of 1974 over 500,000 acres
of land were expropriated by the government under the provisions of the
land reform law.
Land owners whose land has been expropriated may be compensated.
In Chile, after expropriation of land, the government paid 10 percent of
the compensation in cash and the remainder in twenty-five year agrarian
3
Ibid.
4
Zainal Abedin, "Prospects of Agrarian Reforms in Bangladesh"
The Journal of BARD, Vol. 2, No. 122, July 1981 and Jan. 1982, P-24.
5
United Nations, Prospect for the Economic Development of
Bangladesh in the 1980's", Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific
Vo. 31, No. 1, June 1980, p^lOT.
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United Nations, Progress in Land Reform-6th Report (New York:
1976), P-76.
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bonds. In Peru, beneficiaries of reform were to reimburse the govern-
ment for land received over a period of twenty years. In Taiwan after
land reform in 1953, landlords were paid 2.5 times the annual yield.
Seventy percent of the total compensation was paid in land bonds and the
remaining 30 percent in public enterprise stock. In addition to that,
land bond carried an interest of four percent. The purpose of paying
landlords with the stock of government-owned enterprises was to convert
public corporations into private enterprises."
The vital question to be answered now is, if the land is dis-
tributed among the landless poor and they are allowed to cultivate on
their own, will the situation improve or production increase? The answer
is possibly no. Why is this so? In Latin America, grain production in-
creased after land reform. This happened because more and more unculti-
vated lands were brought under cultivation by the new allottees. Another
contributing factor is the amount of land allocated to the reform
beneficiaries. The smallest average allotment in Latin American standards
of 5.7 ha of irrigated land in Chile is over-generous in Asian standards.
In Bangladesh, only two percent of the households owned that much land
in 1977.
In Mexico, the benefit of land reform in terms of equity con-
sideration was short lived. As a result of land reforms between 1910
World Bank, Land Reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile
,
Mexico, Peru & Venezuela, World Bank Staff working paper No. 272, 1978, P-31.
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Ibid, P-28.
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Kang Chao, Economic Effects of Land Reform in Taiwan, Japan and
Mainland China: A Comparative Study (Madison: Land Tenure Center. Ilni-
versity of Wisconsin, 1972), P-5 (Mimeographed).
World Bank, Land Reform in Latin America, P-15.
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to 1940, Mexico managed to have striking reduction in the number of
landless families from 1.1 million to 0.2 million and small farmers
(minifundios) from 2.3 million to 0.83 million 11 However, after another
twenty years, the absolute number of landless families have grown half
way back to the 1910 figure. In 1960, the number of landless and small
farmer families were 1.28 million and .47 million respectively. 12 Smaller
number of minifundio families in 1960 compared to 1940 and large excess
of landless families indicate that fragmentation of land because of pop-
ulation growth is not the cause of increase in the number of landless
poor, rather selling of land to the large farmers is the root cause of it.
This will be more true in the case of Bangladesh, for most of the bene-
ficiaries of land reform will have land around one acre only. Perennial
monetary crisis and a trend of spending lavishly on social occasions like
13
a son or daughter's marriage cause a rural family to lose their only
land asset in a short time as they become landless again. So, for
Bangladesh, transferring of ownership of a small parcel of land alone
will not serve any purpose in the long run.
China had similar problems in the initial years of its socialist
exi stance. From 1948 to 1955 or more exactly from 1950 to 1955, for all
practical purposes, agriculture in China continued to be managed on an
individual basis. Each household was responsible for production decisions
and the selling of its produce from the land alloted to them during land
U
Ibid., P-17. 12 Ibid.
13
People in rural Bangladesh have a trend of getting money by
mortgaging property sometimes to pay for house building or buying food
after a natural disaster or sometimes to pay for expenditures incurred
in a marriage ceremony. And the irony is, in most cases, they cannot
pay back the mortgage amount to get back their property.
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reform. The shortage of capital and other resources were so acute
that as early as 1953, the poor peasants began to fall into debt and
sell their land to richer peasants. As a result though the initial
plan for collectivization was scheduled for 1958 to 1962, it was decided,
in a decision taken by the communist party at its sixth session in 1955,
15
to be expedited. By 1958, all the lands were brought under collective
cultivation and the private ownership of land was abolished.
In Bangladesh, the problem is two directional. One is ensuring
equitable distribution of income and the other is fast increase in agri-
cultural production. Existing output from the land is not sufficient to
feed the population. Every year Bangladesh imports around two million
tons of food grain to fill the deficit. If Bangladesh hopes to avoid
dependency on foreign food grants and imports and if developing the
economy basing on indigenous resources is its aim, then it must generate
enough savings from its agricultural output. This concept of avoiding
dependence on foreign food grant is important considering Bangladesh's
past experience with food aid. Bangladesh's dependence on food aid had
made it vulnerable to the political pressures applied by the donor countries,
Food becomes a tool for political sanction in their hands. The threat to
withhold, cut or slow down deliveries has enabled countries like the
United States to compel policy changes in aid receiving countries. In
1974, the United States used food as a political weapon against Bangladesh.
14
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Supply of food grain under PL 480 was withheld, which ultimately was
responsible for the famine following the worst flood in the preceeding
two decades. More than 25,000 people died of starvation in the worst
hit district of Rangpur. 6 If Bangladesh can double its agricultural
output, it will become a food exporting country. Technically it is
not impossible, since Japan and Korea produces three times more food
grain per acre on land far inferior in quality to Bangladesh. The
use of improved seed and fertilizer is the key to the increase in
agricultural production. Consider an ideal situation: where money to
buy improved seeds and fertilizer is available on easy credit. Even in
such a situation production in small farms under private cultivation will
not increase proportionately - which is evident from the following table. 17
TABLE 6-1
INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN COMILLA COOPERATIVE
Size of Farm Percentage Increase in Yield Per Acre in 1970
Compared to 1963-64 Production
Below 2 acres 78
2 to 3.5 acres 125
Over 3.5 acres 124
Average 98
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While small farmers in Comilla cooperative having land hoi dings of
less than two acres have increased their production by 78 percent; large
farmers increased it by 125 percent. The increase in production by large
farmers can be attributed to their privileges of having easy access to
the cooperative credit and more utilization of fertilizer. Utilization
of fertilizer for local variety winter rice was 29 pounds per acre for
small holdings of less than 2.5 acres, 38 pounds per acre for holdings
between four to six acres and 45.5 pounds for holdings above ten acres
of land. The reason is obvious; compared to big farmers, small farmers
wield less influence and face difficulty in getting agricultural credit.
Even if they get credit, for the reason of other priorities, they do not
use the full amount of money for buying fertilizer. Naturally, input
becomes less in small farms than in large farms. To counter these
problems, a different strategy needs to be identified in order to ensure
an increase in food production.
Proposed Agrarian Reform Program
All expropriated land will be owned by the state. Landless
labourers and peasants can be given nontransferrable usu-fructory right
on the expropriated land after its distribution to them. But their
children can inherit it in the case of death of the allottee.
Any mortgage on this type of land, both verbal and written,
should be considered void and punishable under law. After redistribution
of land, rural households will have lands around one to five acres.
Each village should have two or more agricultural cooperatives in
which all these landowners should become a member. Membership of the
18
Nurul Islam, P-27.
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cooperatives may be optional. But to ensure production, non-cooper-
ative members must satisfy a production quota requirement which should
be strictly monitored. If production goes below the assigned target out-
put, then the non-cooperative farms should either become a member of
the existing cooperative or pay a fine equivalent to the amount it
failed to produce.
The cooperative will maintain a list of all lands owned by
both absentee and working members. Thirty- three percent of the output
will be distributed to the members as divident or rent on the basis of
their share in the land pooled together. The share in the output can be
calculated from the total production of the cooperative. Present ridges
demarcating the land into tiny parcels can be removed and instead ridges
at suitable location can be constructed to retain water and maintain
access.
Work can be performed under different group headings such as
preparation of land, planting, spreading of fertilizer, harvesting, etc.,
or different worker groups can be allocated bulk areas to be cultivated
at their discretion.
For each job, the amount of manhour and animal hour labour neces-
sary should be predetermined in a meeting of the cooperative executive
council elected by the cooperative members. Each job should be task
oriented. Each group responsible for any job should finish the job with-
in the time allocated. Even if they consume more time than what is allo-
cated, still they should get paid for the allocated time only. This will
help avoid policing on the cooperative workers. The cooperative office
can have some salaried employees from the members to keep record of the
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time worked by each individual in a group on the basis of time report
submitted by the group. After each harvesting season, time allocation
for different jobs can be revised basing on the past season's experience.
The cooperative can apply for credit from the agricultural banks in
thana headquarters. All input, like improved variety seeds, fertilizer,
insecticide and farm machineries, should be bought and supplied by the
cooperative.
Out of the remaining 67 percent of the output, 40 percent will
go to the working members. A working member will get enumeration
on the basis of his share of the total input into the production pro-
cess, both in terms of human labour and animal labour. Working members
thus have an edge over the non-working member's for share, that is, 40 per-
cent compared to 33 percent for the non-working members. The amount of
enumeration is tied directly with the production. With the increase
in production, enumeration of the members will also increase.
Remaining 27 percent of the output can become a reserve in the
cooperative collectively owned by the members. This money will be used
for paying back loans, purchasing inputs, paying government taxes, pay-
ing for improvement of land, paying for improvement of housing and
health care facilities and providing for future purchase of farm machinery.
In this system both the working and non-working members will have less
with which to be discontented with. Because both 33 percent or 40 per-
cent of the output, as rent of the land and wages respectively will not
give a enumeration less than 50 percent of the present output if the
present output is increased by only 50 percent. In most cases, in the
present low productive system, shaecropping farmers in Bangladesh get
50 percent of the output and the landowners get the remaining 50 percent
as rent. Shaecropping farmers usually pay for seed and fertilizer. Even
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if the cases of Korea and Indonesia, where rice production is three times
19
and two times that of Bangladesh per acre respectively in 1975, are not
considered, Bangladesh has its own example in Comilla Kotowali thana, as
appeared in table 6-1. In Comilla, rice production per acre in 1970 in-
creased by 125 percent over the 1963 production rate as a result of the
use of improved variety seeds and fertilizer and the cooperative support.
If the food production can be doubled as in Comilla Kotowali
thana, then the cooperatives will have enough savings to mechanize pro-
duction, which will ultimately release some labour to be utilized in
village level small industries, based on raw or intermediate technology.
If necessary, these industries can be seasonal operating during slack
time when there will be less or no work in the agricultural farm. Poultry,
animal husbandry and fish cultivation in derelict ponds, may be some of
the diversifications where surplus agricultural labour can be used.
Village industries, thus created will distribute 40 percent of
their income as wages. Out of the remaining 60 percent, 40 percent will
be kept separate for purchasing inputs, paying taxes, providing for modern-
ization and the remaining 20 percent can be distributed as dividends among
the cooperative members, based on their share in the land pool using a
ratio of 1 to 2 between the non-working and working members. That is,
for the same share in the land pool a working member will get double
the amount of dividend received by a non-working member. This is necessary
for gradual reduction of income disparity between the people. This system
19
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will not eliminate disparity in income but will reduce it to a great extent.
The possibilities of unequal income might work as an incentive to fast
growth.
In Vietnam land reform was carried out in 1956. Until 1969 low
rank agricultural cooperatives (2nd phase of a three phased collectiviza-
tion program) were functioning in Vietnam. In these cooperatives some pro-
duction tools were owned in common but the private land ownership was not
completely abolished. As a result an encouraging growth in productivity
was recorded. In 1960-61 output of paddy was 1 ton/hectare higher than
20
the pre-reform figure of 3.5 ton/hectare. The land distributed to a
five member family in Vietnam is a little more than .33 hectare (.82 acre)
which compares favourably with the suggested land of approximately one
acre to be made available for landless poor in Bangladesh. In the initial
takeoff period, Bangladesh will have to depend primarily on the increase
in agricultural output. This is particularly true, considering the fact
22
that 54.6 percent of GDP is involved with agriculture.
Decentralization of Administration
Bangladesh has inherited an inefficient bureacratically controlled
administration. But there is no denial to the fact that in a country
where only 20 percent of the population is literate, bureaucrats with their
training and specialized administrative ability can play a constructive
role in the development administration, if suitable administrative
structure is developed. Administrative decentralization has now become
20
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a precondition for all development work in the third world countries.
As a first step towards administrative decentralization, all
specialized government agencies should have an office at thana level,
having sufficient power and authority to take decision at the local
level without referring it to the central office. This can be done by
allocating an upper limit in monetary term? up to which thana level officers
can take decisions. Thana should have a separate planning cell staffed
with qualified planners having sufficient expertise to formulate a
comprehensive development plan for the thana. A statistical officer is
necessary to keep quantitative record of growth and decline within the
thana area. Unions should submit a production report by the end of each
year to the thana headquarters.
The thana level officers will work under an elected thana council.
An executive officer will work as coordinator between all the thana
functionaries and the thana council. Thana council will have the ultimate
decision making authority for the development of the thana.
The thana planning department, in conjunction with other govern-
ment agencies, should formulate a plan for development and submit it to
the thana council for approval. Fifty percent of the thana staff,
especially the technical assistants and clerical staff, can be recruited
locally. Their jobs will be non transferrable, and the thana council
will pay their salary. Remaining staffs will be government employee
and their jobs will be transferable to different thanas in Bangladesh.
There should be regular training sessions for the thana level officers
at suitable time intervals in which they can share the experience of
their counterparts in other parts of the country. This will enhance
their skill and they can come back to their respective thanas with new
ideas after each such session. Mechanisms for advancing junior officers
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into higher positions will also increase the productivity and morale of
the organization. The thana council chairman should submit confidential
reports to the central authority on the performance of these officers
in specific terms every year. But the decision to transfer or keep them
should come from the central authority. The central authority will de-
cide on the transfer issue after giving due consideration to the con-
fidential report. This is necessary to avoid political transfer or
transfer arising out of personality clashes with the officer concerned
and the thana chairman.
In the initial years of implementation, thana level officers
may have differences with the thana council on policy matters which will
not remain in the later years because of acclimatization of the officers
with the new setup and increased skill of the council. In the context
of Bangladesh, this factor is indeed very much important. The officers
in most cases are likely to have a higher level of education than the
thana chairman or councilors. This generally leads to a feeling of
superiority among the officers and they in turn try to impose their values
on the people, which is possibly true for all bureaucratic administrations.
When the bureaucrats controlled the administration from district
headquarters the people in the rural areas never felt what is going on
and they never took part in the planning process. As usual, in such
situations, the bureaucrats took all the decisions regarding any area
while the people remained indifferent. But in the present case, the area
being considered is on average 100 square miles and the extreme parts of
thana are eight to ten miles from the thana center. Here people will
know more about their surrounding and they are the right people to de-
cide what is good or bad for them. The executives with their expertise
and analytical skill should make the people aware of the situation and
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suggest schemes for development with all its plus and minus points in
easy understandable terms and also in terms of monetary implications.
The thana plan should be formulated to attain the goals and
objectives of the more generic national plan. The existence of present
subdivisions between the thana and the district is not necessary. Sub-
division staffs can be transferred to the thanas if necessary after re-
training. There should be planning at four major levels; national, divi-
sional, district and thana. Divisional and district level planning will
be regional in nature. Their main emphasis will be on regional coordination
and they should plan projects to be taken up at regional level. The main
thrust of planning activity should be in the thana level. From the
national and regional level, a target production requirement should be
notified to the thanas based on their soil and fertility condition. On
the basis of that target, the thanas will formulate their production plans
for the different unions and villages within the thana boundary.
Thana should further develop a guideline plan for the unions to
follow. This guideline plan should be easy to interpret so that elected
people's representative in the union and villages can implement it with
limited or no planning experience. If the expertise in union level are
developed and activities increased then all the thana level functions
can be taken down to the union level in the final phase of rural develop-
ment in Bangladesh. In addition to the target program for increasing
food production, thana should simultaneously pursue programs for the
elimination of illiteracy and population control.
Thanas should have the authority to tax agricultural output.
These tax incomes can be shared between union, thana and national au-
thorities in varying proportion. The thana master plan should include
a plan for beautification and future infrastructure development in dif-
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ferent phases. Bangladesh is fortunate in at least one respect that its
rural beauty still has remained unspoiled. It does not have much built
environment in the rural areas which need rebuilding. Some highly de-
veloped western countries are now facing the problem of unplanned de-
velopment. Billions of dollars are now spent in the name of slum clear-
ance. From 1978 to 1980 up to $400 million per year was authorized to
assist severely distressed cities and countries through neighborhood
23
reclamation in the USA.
It is now time for Bangladesh to act. Bangladesh can now benefit
from the experience, including costly mistakes done by many of the de-
veloped nations. Infrastructure planning in thana should give due con-
sideration to beautification and environmental planning. If it is done
from the \/ery beginning it can be done at no extra cost.
The Korean people have been wise in that respect. Basic aims
of the Saemaeul movement in Korea are: 1) environmental improvement and
2) increase in income for the villagers. Beautification of village
surroundings is one of the ten topmost programs listed in the priority
24
list of activities to be performed by the movement. A master plan
incorporating the hopes and aspirations of the people in each thana will
definitely help development of the thanas to attain the national goals
and objectives.
Finance for all development work in thanas will come from the
tax income of the thanas and government grant. To ensure development
within the thanas, government grant may be tied with some precondition
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such as achievement of agricultural production target, canal excavation
or village road building target, elimination of illiteracy etc. The
thana can impose the same preconditions to the unions and villages to
qualify for a development grant from the thana development fund. This
will encourage competition between the thanas. Moreoever if a thana fails
to get a government grant the chances of the thana chairman and councilors
getting reelected will be jeopardized. A village will compete with another
village for getting a larger share of the development pie from the thanas.
A possible side effect will be unequal growth between the villages,
thanas and regions. That may be a price Bangladesh will have to pay at
the initial phase of its rural development if it wants fast growth. Con-
flict between efficiency (fast growth) and regional equity were experienced
in Spain and China though the planning processes in both the countries
or pC
differ from each other. ' Communes in China still have varying in-
come. Poor and rich communes or brigades are possible in China. Depend-
ing on the income accrued out of agricultural or industrial production,
commune members in different communes enjoy different incomes and
27
facilities.
But it is not an ill which cannot be countered effectively. Cap-
italist states try to minimize the regional gap by offering high rates
of return and by pumping more government investment money into the low-
income region. Sometimes a moratoria on tax is also used as an incentive.
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Socialist China on the other hand is trying to counter this problem by
pricing grains differently in different regions. The price paid to the
low-income commune for the grain supplied within the assigned quota is
28
relatively high compared to the price paid to the high-income commune.
29
Projects were divided into three different categories in Korea:
1) self help projects, 2) common support projects, and 3) speical
support projects. Similar strategy can be adopted at thana levels for
all development work. Self help projects can be implemented at village
level where the thana will play the role of coordinator among the villages.
Projects needing special help, say if a given thana does not have suffi-
cient resources, can be sent to the next higher level of planning for re-
source allocation. All thana level annual target plans should be done
in the middle of each year based on the past year's experience and the
provisions of the thana comprehensive plan. Emphasis should be given
on the principle "cut your coat according to your cloth".
Both Nurul Islam and Just Faaland et al emphasized the importance
of thana as the nucleus of decentralized economic and political develop-
30 31
ment in Bangladesh. * At the present level of development any attempt
to bring down the administration to a further lower echelon will be
prohibitive both in terms of cost and availability of trained manpower.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY PROPOSALS
Reform measures are suggested to be undertaken in two distinct
areas; land tenure and administration. The criteria are as follows:
Land Reform
1. Maximum ceiling of land to be owned by any household is
five acres
2. Government owned land and the surplus land expropriated from
the big farmers is to be distributed to the landless poor -- minimum land-
holding for any household become one acre
3. Compensation for land expropriated may be two and one-half
to three times the annual yield of the land. Ten percent of the compen-
sation can be paid in cash and remaining in 20 to 30 years agrarian bonds
or stock in public corporations.
4. The state will own the expropriated land. The allottees will
have usu-fructory right only with the provision of transferring that right
to children in case of death of the original allottee.
5. Land allotted thus is not transferable, save as per provi-
sions in proposal three. Any mortgage on such land, written or verbal,
will be considered void and punishable under law.
6. All the people in a village should become a member of any
one of the two or more agricultural cooperatives to be formed in the
village. Membership in the cooperative should be voluntary
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7. All the lands in a village should be pooled under the coop-
eratives in the name of the members. Cooperatives can apply for credit
from the banks at thana headquarters
8. One third of the agricultural output should be distributed
as dividend or rent to the members on the basis of their share in the
land pool, while 40 percent should go as wages to the working members
and the remaining 27 percent to be used for purchasing input, paying
back principal and interest on loan, paying government taxes, pro-
viding housing and health care facilities for the members and providing
for purchase of farm machineries
9. Non-cooperative members can cultivate their land on their
own. But they should comply with a production quota requirement which
should be strictly monitored. If they fail to achieve the production
target either they become a member of the cooperative or pay a fine
equivalent to the amount they failed to produce
10. With the increase in production, cooperatives will have
savings to mechanize production. This will release workers to build
and work in small scale industries in the villages. Savings of the
cooperatives can be used to finance the industries. Forty percent of
income from industries will be distributed as wages to the workers and
forty percent will be kept for the purchase of input, modernization, ex-
pansion, paying taxes, etc. Remaining 20 percent will be utilized for
paying dividends to the members on the basis of their share in the land
pool
-
with a provision that for the same share of land a working member
gets double the dividend of a non-working member.
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Administrative Decentralization
-—
—
—
_
1. Administration should be brought down to the local level.
That is, the Thana is to be the functional administrative unit, all
government agencies should have office at thana level with sufficient
authority to take decisions on local matters at the local level.
2. Thana council is to be elected by popular votes. It should
have final authority on decision making at thana level. Coordination
between the thana level officers and the thana council to be done by an
executive officer responsible for overall administration of thana projects.
3. The thana should have a planning cell staffed by planners
qualified enough to formulate a comprehensive plan for the thana. The
thana should also have a statistical department responsible for keeping
record of growth and decline within the thana boundary.
4. Thana planner, in conjunction with other thana level officers
representing different government agencies, should formulate a compre-
hensive plan for thana development. Important elements of the plan will
be: a) agricultural output plan; b) education plan; c) population con-
trol plan; d) infrastructure development plan; e) housing and industries
plan; etc.
5. The thana should formulate a guideline plan for the union or
villages to follow. The plan should be generic in nature, simple to follow,
so that union or village elected leaders with little or no planning ex-
perience can follow and execute it.
6. One-half of the thana staff can be recruited locally and paid
by the thana council. Remaining 50 percent should be central government
employees transferable to different thanas throughout the country.
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7. The chairman of the thana Council should submit per-
formance evaluation report for all the thana level officers to the
central authority each year.
8. Present subdivisions between the districts and the thanas
are not necessary and can be abolished.
9. Planning should be done at four different levels; national,
divisional, district and the thana. Divisional and district level
planning should be regional in nature. Their main emphasis should be
on regional coordination and they should plan projects to be implemented
at regional level. The main thrust of planning should be directed to-
wards the thana. The thanas should formulate their plan to attain the
goals and objectives of the national plan.
10. Each thana should be assigned a quota for agricultural
production basing on its soil and fertility condition each year. Sim-
ilar quota can be assigned for literacy and population control also.
11. The thanas should have authority to tax agricultural output.
All tax income can be shared between the union, the thana and the state
in varying proportions.
12. Finance for all thana level projects will come from two
sources; 1) thana's own tax income, and 2) government grant. Govern-
ment grant should preferrably be tied with the accomplishment of assigned
targets of production, etc. Different weighing technique can be used
for qualifying or disqualifying a thana for government grant.
13. The thanas can impose the same preconditions on the unions
and villages for getting a share out ot the thana development fund.
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in varying proportions.
12. Finance for all thana level projects will come from two
sources; 1) thana's own tax income, and 2) government grant. Govern-
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and villages for getting a share out of the thana development fund.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The development model of Bangladesh suggested in this study may
be termed as a hybrid model, which has drawn extensively from both the
socialistic and the capitalistic development models. In the context of
Bangladesh, given the poverty and social values of the people, the author
feels that a hybrid model as discussed in the preceding chapters might
be an answer to its development problems.
The proposals and suggestions described in the preceding chapters
are not a panacea for economic development in Bangladesh, nor are they
assumed to be a foolproof solution of distributing income equitably
among the people. For the sake of fast growth, the system advocates
phased reduction in income disparity and at the same time encourages
competition between communities to save more to be invested in manufac-
turing industries. Since private ownership of land exists, private
savings deriving out of an increase in production and an increase in rent
earnings, may be utilized again in private small-scale industries.
Conservative elements in the ruling elites may find these pro-
posals anti-religion or socialistic. On the other hand, ultra-progressive
radical elements might level them as reactionary aiming at inhibiting or
delaying the process of social changes through class struggle. The
liberals, who believe in democracy and incremental changes as a means
toward achieving national goals and objectives, will possibly support
these proposals. Moreover, if the proposals are implemented, there will
69
70
be a shift in the balance of power toward the rural areas.
There is a belief held by many that Bangladesh can 'sink' no
further. However, objective data indicates the fact that Bangladesh is
continuing to decline. The people of Bangladesh, nay the whole Indian
sub-continent, have waited a long time for a revolutionary social change
through class struggle, but all in vain. Do the people have to wait until
all of them are starved to death?
The author believes that if through incremental changes, the
economic health of the people is restored, they will be in a position to
decide their fate themselves. If this 'sinking' is to be forestalled all
resources and potentials are to be utilized to their fullest extent.
Further studies are necessary to determine the impact of social
values of the people on development activities. To be successful, all
development strategies should be calibrated based on these impact studies.
Existing cities in Bangladesh are swelling and government money is con-
stantly pumped into these cities in the name of different development
grants and subsidies. It is now time to reconsider these present urban
development strategies in the context of a predominantly rural country.
Future sutdies in both urban and rural topics will help formulate a
comprehensive development strategy for Bangladesh.
As an initial step, eight thanas, two each from the four divisions
in Bangladesh, might be considered as model thanas for the implementation
of land reform and administrative decentralization program. The lessons
learned in these thanas can then be utilized to implement the program
nationally.
Having suffered as it has over the last few centuries, it is
imperative that Bangladesh, now free, remain a free country. It will be
able to do this through the dedication and hard work of its people if
they choose the correct development policies for their future.
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ABSTRACT
This study has dealt with the problems of rural development in
Bangladesh. The major problems in rural Bangladesh are: a) food short-
age, b) land poverty, c) inequity in income distribution, and d) nat-
ural calamities. In addition to these root problems, some secondary
problems, the cause of which may be attibuted to the root problems, also
need simultaneous attention. These problems are: a) unemployment, b)
school dropout, and c) population growth.
The first five chapters: the introduction; evolution of land
tenure; evolution of administrative structure; national rural development:
past and present, a critical evaluation; and politics of administration
for rural development, analyzed the past and present situations as indi-
cated in the chapter titles. The chapters examined the advantages and
disadvantages, supported with statistical data, of past and present rural
development, policies, the status of land tenure and administrative
structure in Bangladesh.
Based on the analyses of Bangladesh in these five chapters and
several non Bangladesh case studies, in Chapter Six titled "Development
Strategy for the Rural Thanas in Bangladesh", the author advocates a
hybrid planning model for the development of rural thanas in Bangladesh.
The hybrid model tries to incorporate the positive aspects of both
socialistic and capitalistic development models. A new planning and im-
plementation strategy is suggested which requires self reliancy based on
indigenous resources.
Reform activities for Bangladesh are suggested in two major
areas; land tenure and administration. Distribution of surplus lands
from large landowerns to the landless poor is suggested. Maximum and
minimum landholdings per household after redistribution of land is
suggested to be five acres and one acre respectively. Private ownership
of land would continue but with regulations to implement the collectiviza-
tion of land. Absentee landowners would receive 33 percent of output,
working members of the collective would receive 40 percent, and the re-
maining 27 percent would be used for purchasing input, paying of taxes,
purchasing of farm machineries, providing housing and health care facil-
ities and other needs of the members of the collective.
Administrative decentralization is suggested with the thanas
becoming the rural administrative centers. The main thrust of planning
activities would be in the thanas and the administration would be de-
centralized to the local level to ensure "grassroots" participation in
the planning and implementation stages. The thana would have taxing
authority and planning function. Each thana would be assigned a goal
for agricultural production, eradication of illiteracy and population
control etc. The government development grant to the thanas would be
made conditional to the attainment of production and other goals assigned
by the government. Each thana would formulate its annual target plan
on the basis of a comprehensive plan tailor made to the specific require-
ment of the thana under the broad guideline of a national plan.
Chapter Five titled "Politics of Administration for Rural De-
velopment" further deals with political issues involving development
administration with particular emphasis on power sharing by the bureau-
crats, military, urban middle class and rural elites in Bangladesh.
Chapter Seven summarizes all proposals advocated in the study.
Finally, in conclusion, eight thanas; two each in four divisions
are suggested to be taken as model thanas for trial implementation of
this program. The result of that test could then be utilized to implement
the program throughout the nation.
